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The Interplay between Consumer Protection and Competition Law in 
India 
Suhail Nathani DQG3ÕQDU$NPDQ 
(2017) 5 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 197-215 
Abstract 
The protection of the interests of consumers is a central aspect of all modern 
competition laws as well as a direct aim of consumer protection laws. However, despite 
being complementary in many ways, competition and consumer protection laws cover 
different issues and employ different methods to achieve their goals. Whilst consumer 
protection rules are built upon the premise that consumers are the weaker party to 
transactions and should be directly protected for this reason in their dealings with 
traders through certain consumer rights, competition law only indirectly protects the 
FRQVXPHUV¶HFRQRPLFZHOO-being by ensuring that the markets are subject to effective 
competition. This article explores the interplay between consumer protection and 
competition law in the Indian context with some comparison with the EU position, 
where relevant. After an examination of the relevant legislation and case law, the 
article finds that given that the mandate of the Competition Commission of India is to 
prevent practices having an adverse effect on competition, in cases of overlap between 
consumer protection and competition laws, the Authority should act only on the basis 
of adverse effects on competition7KHWUHDWPHQWRIµXQIDLUWUDGHSUDFWLFHV¶LVXVHGWR
demonstrate the appropriateness of this approach. 
 
I. Introduction 
Around the world, many jurisdictions continue to explore the optimal relationship 
between competition law and consumer protection law. To this end, policy choices are 
made in some countries to unite the legal rules as well as the enforcement of these two 
areas of law whilst other countries choose to separate the rules as well as the 
enforcement of these two closely related but distinct areas of law. More often than not, 
choices made at a given point in time are reversed at a later point as was observed, for 
example, in the case of the UK which first combined competition and consumer powers 
at the Office of Fair Trading to later divest them when a new competition authority 
(Competition and Markets Authority) was formed. India has similarly been exploring 
the optimal relationship between its competition law and consumer protection law. 
After initially combining competition and consumer protection rules in a singular Act 
(Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1970) with the enactment of the 
Consumer Protection Act in 1986 and the enactment of the Competition Act in 2002, 
there was a division both in the rules and also in the enforcement functions. However, 
given that both areas of law are concerned with the interests of consumers, albeit 
indirectly in competition law and directly in consumer law, getting the relationship 
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between these areas of law right is still pivotal for ensuring that there is no confusion 
between the application of the rules. Despite their close proximity, competition law 
and consumer protection law are distinct areas of law with different underlying 
theories of harm and objectives. Whereas consumer protection rules are built upon the 
premise that consumers are the weaker party to transactions and should be directly 
protected for this reason in their dealings with traders by the enforcing of certain 
FRQVXPHUULJKWVFRPSHWLWLRQ ODZRQO\ LQGLUHFWO\SURWHFWV WKHFRQVXPHUV¶HFRQRPLF
well-being through ensuring that the goods and services are produced and priced 
competitively.  
Competition enforcement world over is predicated on two identifiable theories of harm. 
It considers harm to consumers and harm to competition as pivotal. However, this 
dual association with consumer welfare and protection of competition often requires 
the competition regulator to re-prioritize enforcement measures - at times in the 
interests of consumers and at times in the interests of business. As we enter the 
seventh year of enforcement of Indian competition law, two questions assume a high 
level of importance: Are these priorities well defined? Does adopting one measure 
mean the absence of the other? This paper primarily considers the differences and 
similarities between competition and consumer protection law and considers what 
combination of these presents a mechanism to address these identifiable theories of 
harm. This is done by exploring the state of the relationship between competition law 
and consumer protection law in India while contrasting this with the same relationship 
under EU law to the extent relevant. In pursuit of this aim, this article examines the 
relevant rules as well as the enforcement regime. In this examination, the prohibition 
of µunfair trade practices¶ is used as an example that demonstrates the interplay 
between these different areas of law. 
We proceed with a fundamental premise: both competition and consumer protection 
law embrace the interests of the consumer, albeit in different ways. In the Indian 
context, the &RQVXPHU3URWHFWLRQ$FW³&RQVXPHU$FW´ does so explicitly, while 
WKH&RPSHWLWLRQ$FW³&RPSHWLWLRQ$FW´GRHVVRE\QHFHVVDU\LPSOLFDWLRQVLQFH
any trade or business ultimately results in the provision of goods or services to the 
consumer. The legislative history of these enactments shed considerable light on the 
overlaps and differences between the statutes. In the EU context, the question whether 
consumer welfare and more broadly, consumer interests should guide the decisional 
practice in the application of competition law is a hotly debated one after more than 
fifty years of enforcement. In fact, it reveals a potential area of tension between the 
enforcement actions of the European Commission and the judgments of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union in this area of the law. It is also a question that reveals 
conflicting views on what the goals of competition law are and should be.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section II presents the legislative background in 
India as well as the EU. Section III assesses the interplay between consumer protection 
DQG FRPSHWLWLRQ LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI µXQIDLU WUDGH SUDFWLFHV¶ DQG µUHVWULFWLYH WUDGH
SUDFWLFHV¶LQ,QGLD6HFWLRQ,9GHPRQVWUDWHVWKHLPSR
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µXQIDLUWUDGHSUDFWLFHV¶DQGµUHVWULFWLYHWUDGHSUDFWLFHV¶LQDGLVFXVVLRQWKDWLVPDLQO\
focussed on India but that also draws on the experiences from the EU and to a degree 
the United States. Section V concludes by finding that despite being a young 
competition law jurisdiction, due to the specificities of the legislation and other factors, 
India is in fact in a good position to correctly separate consumer protection issues from 
competition law issues. In this respect, much depends on the Competition 
Commission of India¶V making the right call in specific enforcement decisions. 
II. The Legislative background 
(a) India 
The approach of the Consumer Act was to create a new law to protect the interests of 
the consumer and to fill the gap in the field of consumer protection. The Law 
Commission of India explains this in its 199th Report that in spite of various provisions 
providing protection to the consumer in different enactments like CPC 1908, Indian 
Contract Act 1872, Sale of Goods Act 1930, etc. very little could be achieved in the area 
of consumer protection. Though the MRTP Act, 1969 has provided relief to the 
consumers, yet it became necessary to protect consumers from exploitation and to save 
them from adulterated and substandard goods and deficient services and unfair 
business practices. The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (CPA) was thus framed to 
protect consumers from unfair and undesirable practices of business community. The 
Act came into force in 1987 and was further amended from time to time. 
As the Law Commission explained, the gap was not the availability of a statutory 
framework as much as the existence of a specialized body that dealt exclusively with 
practices harming the interests of consumers. The then existing Monopolies and 
Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (MRTP) established under the Monopolies 
and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 (MRTPA) with a dual mandate to deal with 
both anti-competitive and anti-consumer practices was found to be too broad in its 
mandate. It dealt with unfair trade practices (UTP) that concerned harm to consumers 
as well as monopolistic and restrictive practices (RTP) that threatened competition 
and consumer welfare. 
Generally, UTPs refer to any unfair method or unfair or deceptive practice employed 
to promote the use, sale or supply of any goods or provision of services.1 RTPs are 
                                                          
1Section 2(r) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. It defines UTPs as: 
"unfair trade practice" means a trade practice which, for the purpose of promoting the sale, use or supply of any 
goods or for the provision of any service, adopts any unfair method or unfair or deceptive practice including any of 
the following practices, namely;² 
(1)   the practice of making any statement, whether orally or in writing or by visible representation which,² 
(i)   falsely represents that the goods are of a particular standard, quality, quantity, grade, composition, style or 
model; 
(ii)  falsely represents that the services are of a particular standard, quality or grade; 
(iii)  falsely represents any re-built, second-hand, reno­vated, reconditioned or old goods as new goods; 
(iv)  represents that the goods or services have sponsor­ship, approval, performance, characteristics, accesso­ries, 
uses or benefits which such goods or services do not have; 
(v)   represents that the seller or the supplier has a spon­sorship or approval or affiliation which such seller or 
supplier does not have; 
(vi)  makes a false or misleading representation concern­ing the need for, or the usefulness of, any goods or services; 
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understood to be trade practices that have or may have the effect of preventing, 
distorting or restricting competition. The term monopolistic practice is often used 
interchangeably with restrictive practices.2  
UTPs were included within the scope of the MRTP only in the year 1984 pursuant to 
recommendations of a Committee under the Chairmanship of Justice Rajinder Sachar 
³6DFKDU &RPPLWWHH´.3 This Committee recognized that curbing monopolistic and 
restrictive trade practices (RTP) would only partially resolve consumer grievances by 
eliminating the effects of such practices. The 6DFKDU&RPPLWWHH¶Vreport proposed a 
framework to deal with practices that aimed at harming the consumer directly and 
HTXDOLVH WKH FRQVXPHU¶V SRVLWLRQ YLV-à-vis the business. 7KH &RPPLWWHH¶V
recommendations were incorporated into the MRTPA by an amendment in the year 
1984.4  
UTPs were defined as ³practices that were directed at misleading or deceiving a 
consumer by making representations regarding the price, quality or use of goods or 
services or by misleading advertisements or by any misleading offer of gifts´. Further, 
the Act proscribed the practice of hoarding or destruction of goods or a refusal to sell 
intended at raising the price of the same or similar goods.  
Simultaneously, the MRTPA also disallowed RTPs that aimed at obstructing the flow 
of capital or resources into the market or which brought about price manipulation or 
conditions of delivery or practices that affected the flow of supplies in the market 
relating to goods or services in such manner as to impose unjustified costs or 
restrictions on consumers.  
                                                          
(vii) gives to the public any warranty or guarantee of the performance, efficacy or length of life of a product or of 
any goods that is not based on an adequate or proper test thereof; 
      Provided that where a defence is raised to the effect that such warranty or guarantee is based on adequate or 
proper test, the burden of proof of such defence shall lie on the person raising such defence; 
(viii)makes to the public a representation in a form that purports to be² 
(i)   a warranty or guarantee of a product or of any goods or services; or 
(ii)   a promise to replace, maintain or repair an article or any part thereof or to repeat or continue a service until it 
has achieved a specified result, if such purported warranty or guarantee or prom­ise is materially misleading or if 
there is no reasonable prospect that such warranty, guaran­tee or promise will be carried out; 
(ix)  materially misleads the public concerning the price at which a product or like products or goods or services, 
have been or are, ordinarily sold or provided, and, for this purpose, a representation as to price shall be deemed to 
refer to the price at which the product or goods or services has or have been sold by sellers or provided by suppliers 
generally in the relevant market unless it is clearly specified to be the price at which the product has been sold or 
services have been provided by the person by whom or on whose behalf the representation is made; 
(x)  gives false or misleading facts disparaging the goods, services or trade of another person. [Explanations 
omitted.] 
2 The Indian Monopolies Inquiry Commission, 1965. 
3Report of the High Powered Expert Committee on Companies and MRTP Act, August 1978. Taking into account 
the experience of the working of the MRTP Act in this country and the Monopolies and Anti-Trust Legislations in 
other countries of the world, we are suggesting the broadening of the scope of the Act. Thus, while all 
modern .legislations on the subject accept the need for providing, protection to the consumers, the present Act does 
not deal at all with what is commonly known as unfair, trade practices namely, misleading advertisements, false 
information to dupe consumers etc., it also does not provide for any remedy against such practices by 
manufacturers or dealers. We are, therefore, suggesting the need for introducing a new chapter defining these 
practices and also providing for definite remedy to the, consumers against .these unfair trade practices. [Sachar 
Committee Report] 
4MRTP (Amendment) Act, 1984, w.e.f 01 August 1984. 
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In the year 1991, the Parliament had a relook at UTP provisions in the MRTPA and 
broadened their scope.5 It did so by inserting the words ³adopts any unfair method or 
unfair or deceptive practice including any of the following practices´ into the section 
header. This essentially made the practice to deceive a consumer paramount (and not 
the form) and rendered the list of UTPs provided under the MRTPA non-exhaustive. 
A telling effect of this amendment came with the decision of the Supreme Court of 
India in Om Prakash vs. Assistant Engineer, Haryana Agro Industries Corporation 
Limited and Anr.6 The Court was hearing an appeal from the National Commission 
established under the Consumer Act. In those years, the Consumer Act relied upon the 
0573$WRGHILQHDQ8737KHDSSHOODQWZDVDJJULHYHGE\DµSLFNDQGFKRRVH¶GHOLYHU\
policy of the respondent that resulted in an increase in price of the tractor he 
purchased from the respondent. The Supreme Court noted that prior to the 1991 
amendment, the list of UTPs under the MRTPA was exhaustive. Since the MRTPA (at 
the time of sale of the tractor) RQO\SURVFULEHGWKHSUDFWLFHRIµKRDUGLQJRUGHVWUXFWLRQ
RUUHIXVDOWRVHOOJRRGVRUVHUYLFHVZLWKWKHREMHFWRIUDLVLQJWKHLUSULFH¶, the Court noted 
that mere delay in delivering the tractor, notwithstanding that the delay was 
intentional, would not constitute a UTP. However, pursuant to the 1991 amendment, 
all unfair methods or unfair or deceptive practices (including those assailed in this case) 
would constitute UTPs. 
Two years after the recommendations of the Sachar Committee which brought UTPs 
in the fold of the MRTP, the Parliament enacted the Consumer Act. The Consumer Act 
was to become a parallel legislation for regulating UTPs. Its principle object was  the 
³better protection of the interests of consumers and for that purpose to make provision 
for the establishment of consumer councils and other authorities for the settlement of 
FRQVXPHUV
 GLVSXWHV DQG IRU PDWWHUV FRQQHFWHG WKHUHZLWK´. It established district, 
state and national level forums to deal with consumer disputes. The Consumer Act and 
MRTPA prohibited similar UTPs and defined them identically. As originally enacted, 
the Consumer Act did not cover RTPs.7  By an amendment in the year 1993,8  the 
&RQVXPHU$FWZDVDPHQGHGWRLQFOXGH573VLQWKHQDWXUHRIµtie-in¶ sales. By another 
amendment in the year 2002,9 delays in the supply of goods or services intended to 
inflate the price were covered as RTPs under the Consumer Act. The scope of the 
Consumer Act in regulating RTPs was much narrower than the MRTPA, which 
regarded RTPs as practices which had the effect of preventing, distorting or restricting 
competition. In particular, the MRTPA proscribed practices which tend to obstruct the 
flow of capital or resources into the stream of production as an RTP. Likewise, 
manipulation of prices, conditions of delivery or flow of supply in the market which 
may have the effect of imposing on the consumer unjustified costs or restrictions were 
regarded as RTPs.10  
                                                          
5MRTP (Amendment) Act, 1991 w.e.f 27 September 1991. 
61994 (2) SCALE 530, alt(1994) 3 SCC 504, 1994 3 SCR 463. 
7Consumer (Protection) Bill, 1986. 
8Consumer Protection (Amendment) Act, 1993. 
9Consumer Protection (Amendment) Act, 2002. 
10 Section 2(o) of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969. 
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A significant similarity between the MRTPA and the Consumer Act on the issue of 
UTPs was the status of consumers. The Consumer Act did not protect buyers who 
SXUFKDVHGJRRGVRUVHUYLFHVIRUDµFRPPHUFLDOSXUSRVH¶IURPSHWLWLRQLQJWKHConsumer 
Forums. Consequently, commercial purchasers who purchased to resell were not 
included within the ambit of a consumer. While the MRTPA did not define a consumer, 
given the similarity of UTP provisions with the Consumer Act, Indian courts relied on 
the definition of consumers in the latter statute.11  Thus, neither statute protected 
consumers against UTPs practiced by commercial purchasers/ buyers.  
With the liberalisation of the Indian economy in the year 1991 and trade liberalisation 
in the domestic market and trade protectionism under the World Trade Organisation, 
the scope of the existing market regulation law ± the MRTPA ± was found to be 
insufficient to deal with the needs of the domestic industry and competition from a 
globalised trade. The Government of India set up a Committee under the 
Chairmanship of Mr. S.V.S. Raghavan in the year 1999 to suggest measures to adopt a 
more robust competition policy ³5DJKDYDQ&RPPLWWHH´).12 This Committee suggested 
the repeal of the MRTPA by a comprehensive competition statute modelled in line with 
WKH &RPPLWWHH¶V VXJJHVWLRQV 6LJQLILFDQWO\ WKH &RPPLWWee proposed that the 
Competition Commission of India (CCI), to be established under the new statute, 
would deal with monopolistic and RTPs while UTPs were to be transferred to the 
adjudication machinery under the Consumer Act. The Committee set the agenda for a 
new competition policy in the following terms: 
7KHXOWLPDWHUDLVRQG¶rWUHRIFRPSHWLWLRQLVWKHLQWHUHVWRIWKHFRQVXPHU7KH
FRQVXPHU¶VULJKWWRIUHHDQGIDLUFRPSHWLWLRQFDQQRWEHGHQLHGE\DQ\RWKHU
consideration. There is also a need for supportive institutions to strengthen a 
competitive society notably, adequate spread of information throughout the 
market, free and easy communication and ready accessibility of 
goods...Competition policy should thus have the positive objective of 
promoting consumer welfare.13 
 
(b) The European Union 
In the EU, the competition rules are found in the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) and have been a cornerstone of the European integration 
project from the start. Article 101 TFEU prohibits all anticompetitive agreements, 
concerted practices and decisions of association of undertakings that have as their 
object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
internal market to the extent that they affect trade between Member States. Article 102 
TFEU, in contrast, prohibits the abuse of a dominant position on the internal market 
or on a substantial part thereof to the extent that it may affect trade between Member 
States. Relevant for the purposes of the current article, Article 102 (a) TFEU prohibits, 
as an example of abuse, the direct or indirect imposition of unfair purchase or selling 
                                                          
11 AIR 1989 Delhi 329, 1988 64 CompCas 884 Delhi. 
12SVS Raghavan Committee on Competition Policy and Law. 
13Ibid, ¶1.1.9 - ¶1.2.1. 
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prices or other unfair trading conditions. This prohibition of unfair practices raises the 
question, similar to the Indian context, of what the relation between UTPs and 
anticompetitive abusive practices is.  
In terms of consumer protection rules, it is noteworthy that such rules were not 
included in the original Treaties of Rome that established the European Economic 
Community. This is not entirely surprising, however, since it is generally thought that 
WKHµFRQVXPHULVWVRFLHW\¶HPHUJHGIURPWKHHFRQRPLFDQGVRFLDOGHYHORSPHQWV after 
World War II.14  Arguably, in Europe, consumer interests were barely recognised until 
the 60s and 70s and initially, consumer protection rules only played a supporting role 
in the market integration process unlike the competition rules which took the central 
stage.15 It was the Single European Act in 1987 when consumer protection first became 
part of Treaties as an autonomous policy aim.16 Currently, consumer protection is a 
general objective of the EU and a high level of consumer protection is guaranteed in 
both the Charter of Fundamental Rights of The European Union and by means of 
several provisions in the TFEU.17 Numerous Directives have been adopted in the EU 
tackling numerous issues of consumer protection as well as some Directives that are 
general in nature in terms of applicability such as the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive, Unfair Contract Terms Directive and the Consumer Rights Directive. 18 
6LPLODUWRWKH,QGLDQOHJLVODWLRQLQWKH(8 µFRQVXPHU¶UHIHUVWRany natural person 
who is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business, craft or profession.19 
,QFRQWUDVWLQ(8FRPSHWLWLRQODZµFRQVXPHU¶LVPRUHEURDGO\GHILned and essentially 
PHDQV µFXVWRPHU¶ ZKLFK GRHV LQFOXGH RWKHU EXVLQHVVHV 20  It is also notable that 
consumer protection in the EU aims not only at providing a high level of consumer 
protection as such but also balancing this against ensuring the competitiveness of 
enterprises. 21 For example, the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive explicitly 
stipulates that E\ GLUHFWO\ SURWHFWLQJ FRQVXPHUV¶ HFRQRPLF LQWHUHVWV IURP µXQIDLU
business-to-FRQVXPHUFRPPHUFLDOSUDFWLFHV¶WKH'LUHFWLYHWKHUHE\µLQGLUHFWO\SURWHFWV
legitimate businesses from their competitors who do not play by the rules in this 
                                                          
14K Cseres Competition Law and Consumer Protection (Kluwer Law International 2005) 152. 
15Cseres (n 14) 160, 193. 
16See Cseres (n 14) 193-202 for the historical development of consumer protection rules in the EU. 
17 See eg Art 12 TFEU, Art 169(1) TFEU, Art 169(2) (a) TFEU. 
18See Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament And of The Council of 11 May 2005concerning unfair 
business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, 
Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation 
(EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of WKH&RXQFLOµ8QIDLU&RPPHUFLDO3UDFWLFHV'LUHFWLYH¶
>@2-/&RXQFLO'LUHFWLYH((&RI$SULORQXQIDLUWHUPVLQFRQVXPHUFRQWUDFWVµ8QIDLU
&RQWUDFW7HUPV'LUHFWLYH¶>3] OJ L95/29; and the Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament And of 
the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 
1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and 
'LUHFWLYH(&RIWKH(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQWDQGRIWKH&RXQFLOµ&RQVXPHU5LJKWV'LUHFWLYH¶>@2-
L304/64. 
19Article 2(1) Consumer Rights Directive. 
20See eg &RPPXQLFDWLRQIURPWKH&RPPLVVLRQµ*XLGHOLQHVRQWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRI $UWLFOHRIWKH7UHDW\¶
>@2-&Q&RPPXQLFDWLRQIURPWKH&RPPLVVLRQµ*XLGDQFHRQWKH&RPPLVVLRQ
VHQIRUFHPHQW
SULRULWLHVLQDSSO\LQJ$UWLFOHRIWKH(&7UHDW\WRDEXVLYHH[FOXVLRQDU\FRQGXFWE\GRPLQDQWXQGHUWDNLQJV¶
[2009] OJ c45/7, Q6HH3$NPDQµ6HDUFKLQJIRUWKH/RQJ-/RVW6RXORI$UWLFOH('¶2[IRUG
-RXUQDORI/HJDO6WXGLHVRQWKHOHJLVODWLYHLQWHQW6HH3$NPDQµ³&RQVXPHU´YHUVXV³&XVWRPHU´WKH'HYLOLQ
WKH'HWDLO¶-RXUQDORI/DZDQG6RFLHW\315on the implications of treating customers as consumers. 
21See eg Recital 4 of CRD.  
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Directive, and thus guarantees fair competition in fields coordinated by it¶.22 Similarly, 
the Consumer Rights Directive explicitly notes that the objective of the Directive is to 
FRQWULEXWHWRµWKHSURSHUIXQFWLRQLQJRIWKHLQWHUQDOPDUNHW¶WKURXJKWKHDFKLHYHPHQW
of a high level of consumer protection.23 According to Protocol 27 annexed to the TFEU 
and the Treaty on European Union (TEU)the internal market, as set out in Article 3 
TEU, includes a system ensuring that competition is not distorted. Thus, in the EU 
context, the competition rules and consumer protection rules are intricately linked by 
the common objective of ensuring the proper functioning of the internal market. The 
precise relationship between these areas of law, particularly when it comes to 
enforcement action in individual cases, however, is as much an issue in the EU context 
as it is in the Indian context.  
III. The Interplay between Consumer Protection and Competition in the 
Context of UTPs and RTPs in India 
The treatment of RTPs and UTPs in India in the enforcement of the Consumer Act and 
the Competition Act presents an interesting overlap in terms of functions.  
(a) Restrictive trade practices 
The treatment of RTPs displays the intersection between the substance and 
enforcement of the two Acts as well as the potential issues that can follow from this 
intersection. The Consumer Act proscribes RTPs which tend to bring about 
manipulation of price or conditions of delivery or to affect flow of supplies in the 
market relating to goods or services in such a manner as to impose on consumers 
unjustified costs or restrictions and include µtie-in¶ VDOHVDQGµdelayed supplies¶ ± with 
a view to raising the price of goods or services.  While the Raghavan Committee 
LGHQWLILHG WKH PLQRU RYHUODS EHWZHHQ WKH WZR $FWV LQ WHUPV RI µtie-in¶ sales, 24  the 
definition of RTPs under the Consumer Act is undeniably broad and would include 
within its scope any trade practice that tends to bring about manipulation of price or 
conditions of delivery or to affect flow of supplies in the market relating to goods or 
services in such a manner as to impose on the consumers unjustified costs or 
restrictions. Another amendment to the Consumer Act in the year 2002,25 expressly 
prohibited any ³delay beyond the period agreed to by a trader in supply of such goods 
RULQSURYLGLQJWKHVHUYLFHVZKLFKKDVOHGRULVOLNHO\WROHDGWRULVHLQWKHSULFH´.  It is 
likely that because this amendment came in a year after the Raghavan Committee 
Report and at the same time as the notification of the Competition Act, its effect was 
not examined by the Raghavan Committee.  As such, there does exist a significant an 
overlap in terms of regulation of RTPs between the Competition and Consumer Act.  
But how does this overlap play out in terms of regulation of RTPs? The Competition 
Act requires, as a condition precedent, the existence of an agreement between traders. 
                                                          
22See Recital 8 of Unfair Commercial Practices Directive. 
23 Recital 65 CRD. 
24Ibid, ¶7.3.9 
25  See Section 2(5) of the Consumer Protection (Amendment) Act, 2002. 
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It applies a per se standard in relation to horizontal agreements26 and a rule of reason 
standard for vertical agreements. 27  This is somewhat similar to the enforcement 
history under the MRTPA. In its initial years the MRTPA distinguished the RTPs 
within its scope to be actionable only where they eliminated or restricted 
competition.28 By an amendment in the year 1984, the Parliament included a per se 
standard for RTP contravention in the MRTPA.29 However, even after this amendment, 
some RTPs remained subject to a rule of reason analysis.30  
With regard to regulation of dominant entities, the Competition Act prohibits RTPs to 
WKHH[WHQWWKDWWKH\DPRXQWWRDQDEXVHRIGRPLQDQWSRVLWLRQ0DWHULDOO\WKH&&,¶V
enforcement history under the Competition Act does not shed much light on whether 
RTPs in the form of abuse of dominance require a rule of reason or per se analysis. In 
NSE,31 the CCI inter alia considered whether a transaction fee waiver in the currency 
derivates segment by the National Stock Exchange breached Section 4 32  of the 
Competition Act. The CCI held that 
the WHUP³XQIDLU´PHQWLRQHGLQVHFWLRQRIWKH$FWKDVWREHH[DPLQHGHLWKHU
in the context of unfairness in relation to customer or in relation to a competitor. 
The CCI observed that >16(¶V@FRQWHQWLRQWKDWWKHUHLVQRREVHUYDWLRQRQKDUP
to consumers in WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VRUGHUGDWHGDQGKHQFHWKHUHLVQR
element of abuse deserves to be dismissed because section 4 does not require it 
to be established. The section first and foremost requires that it be established 
that an enterprise or group is in dominant position in the relevant market. 
Thereafter, it is required to establish that it has engaged in a conduct as specified 
in clauses (a) to (e) of the section. Once both are established, there is no 
statutory requirement to examine any other additional impact on competitors 
or consumers or the market. The Commission, in its order has amply established 
the aforementioned two questions. Section 4 of the Act, unlike section 3 does 
not require evaluation of appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC) or 
evaluation of the factors mentioned in section 19(3), which include accrual of 
benefits to consumers. 
 
Given the &&,¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIabsence of a requirement to demonstrate elimination 
or restriction of competition under the Consumer Act, the  decision in NSE naturally 
calls for a re-examination of the co-extensive treatment of RTPs under the Consumer 
and Competition Acts (with the caveat that in NSE, the complainant MCX was a 
competitor and not a consumer))URPWKH&&,¶VGHFLVLRQLQNSE, it would appear that 
neither statute employs a strict effects based standard. While this is certainly true for 
the Consumer Act, which requires direct harm to a consumer for issuance of cease and 
desist and compensation orders, WKH &&,¶V GHFLVLRQDO SUDFWLFH Rn Section 4 of the 
                                                          
26  Agreements between players engaged in an identical trade. 
27  Agreements between players at different levels of the production chain. 
28Rajasthan Housing Board v. Parvati Devi (Smt.) and others; Appeal (civil) 14994 of 1996 judgment dated 03 May 
2000.  
29Ibid. 
30M/s. Voltas Limited Bombay vs. Union of India AIR 1995 SC 1881.  
31MCX Stock Exchange Ltd. Vs. National Stock Exchange of India Ltd., DotEx International Ltd. and Omnesys 
Technologies Pvt. Ltd., CCI Case No. 13 of 2009, Order dated 03 June 2011.  
32Section 4 of the Competition Act prohibits an abuse of dominant position. 
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Competition Act does not appear to suggest an effects based standard for enforcement 
either as stated in NSE. Thus, it appears that both the Consumer Act and the 
Competition Act are enforced in the context of RTPs without requiring a 
demonstration of harmful effects on competition or consumers. While it was never the 
intent of the Consumer Act to look at any potential harm to a body of consumers, the 
broad mandate laid on the CCI under Section 18 of the Competition Act, which 
requires the CCI to eliminate practices having adverse effect on competition, promote 
and sustain competition, protect the interests of consumers and ensure freedom of 
trade carried on by other participants, in markets in India, makes a strong case for a 
rule of reason approach to Section 4 of the Competition Act. In section X below we 
discuss whether the Competition Act supports such a construction. 
(b) Interests of consumers 
Another important difference between the two Acts is the treatment of the consumer. 
Under the Competition Act, consumers include persons who buy goods or services 
LUUHVSHFWLYHRIZKHWKHUWKH\XVHLWIRUDµcommercial purpose¶33, resale or for personal 
use. This is in line with the preamble to the Act which requires the CCI to 
...prevent practices having adverse effect on competition, to promote and 
sustain competition in markets, to protect the interests of consumers and to 
ensure freedom of trade carried on by other participants in markets, in India.34 
 
Unlike the MRTPA, there is also no requirement that the adjudication machinery 
under the Competition Act should be triggered by a consumer.35Under the Consumer 
Act, a consumer is a person who purchases goods or services, but not for a commercial 
purpose. This demonstrates that the purpose of the Consumer Act is to protect the 
interests of final consumers and not other traders engaged in a different trade. This 
distinction is clear from the grievance redress functions under both statutes and the 
addressability of their orders. The Consumer Act addresses consumer disputes against 
traders directly, while the Competition Act addresses consumer welfare indirectly by 
ensuring that efficiencies are promoted and more choices are available to consumers. 
In practice we see that this distinction is often very blurred. A significant example of 
direct regulation in favour of the consumer is the DLF case.36 It involved a complaint 
by an association of apartment owners assailing certain terms and conditions iQ'/)¶V
VWDQGDUGIRUP$SDUWPHQW%X\HU¶V$JUHHPHQW and alleging abuse of dominance by DLF. 
7KHVHWHUPVLQFOXGHG'/)¶VGLVFUHWLRQWRFKDQJHWKHOD\RXWDQGQDWXUHRIXVHRIWKH
apartment complex without the consent of apartment allottees, its right to change the 
super area of the complex without consulting allottees and other clauses including 
                                                          
33Ibid. 
34Preamble to the Competition Act, 2002. 
35µ,QIRUPDWLRQ¶FDQEHILOHGE\DQ\SHUVRQXQGHU6HFWLRQRIWKH&RPSHWLWLRQ$FW+RZHYHUWKH&RPSHWLWLRQ
Appellate Tribunal has stressed on the need to evaluate the locus standi of informants;   L.H. Hiranandani Hospital 
Vs. Competition Commission of India and Ors. Order of the Competition Appellate Tribunal in Appeal No. 19 of 
2014 dated 18 December 2015. 
36%HODLUH2ZQHU¶V$VVRFLDWLRQYV'/)/LPLWHG&&,2UGHUGDWHG$XJXVWLQ&DVH1RRI 
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additional payments. Additionally, the complaint charged DLF with imposing unfair 
terms in its conduct against apartment allottees. In a final order penalizing DLF with 
a penalty of 6.3 billion rupees, the CCI directed DLF to cease and desist from 
µIRUPXODWLQJ¶DQGµLPSRVLQJ¶µXQIDLU¶WHUPVLQLWVDJUHHPHQWVZLWKEX\HUVLQ*XUJDRQ
The CCI also directed DLF to modify its agreements with buyers. The order 
characterised the DEXVHSUDFWLFHGE\'/)DVµXQIDLU¶DQGµHYHQH[SORLWDWLYH¶ 
The DLF case presents an interesting example of how the lines between competition 
and consumer processes are blurred. 7KH&&,KHOGWKDW'/)¶V real estate malpractices 
distorted competition in the real estate market in Gurgaon - a narrow geographic 
coverage of a satellite town in the National Capital Region of Delhi. The CCI held that 
such practices reduced the ease of shifting between services or offerings. It therefore 
suggested that for those consumers who had exercised an option to purchase an 
apartment from DLF, the incremental cost of switching to another real estate 
developer and absence of adequate information to the consumer to understand the 
value and cost of his investment, distorted competition for other real estate players. 
According to the CCI 
[i]n such cases the buyer who could have made a choice to go to other real estate 
service providers, gets locked in with DLF having paid a substantial amount, 
with no free exit option, without even being aware of the sweeping terms and 
conditions being imposed through the Agreement. The high switching cost not 
only destroys the choice, it also reduces mobility in the market. Information 
asymmetry created by such lock-in, in absence of the knowledge of terms and 
conditions of the Agreement is having distortionary effect not only on the 
competition in the market but also on consumer welfare.37 
 
While arguably the CCI did identify a theory of harm in the competition space, whether 
these measures resulted in increased choice, quality and price competition in the real 
estate space for consumers is debatable. The CCI answers these questions in the part 
where it considers WKHHIIHFWVRI'/)¶VFRQGXFWRQRWKHUSOD\HUVLQWKHUHDO estate space 
and particularly in the real estate market it found that other players are likely to imitate 
the terms and conditions employed by DLF; a consequence that would impede 
consumer welfare. 
:KLOH DIILUPLQJ WKH &&,¶V GHFLVLRQ LQ DSSHDO WKH &RPSHWLtion Appellate Tribunal 
noted that ³the order of CCI as well as this judgment is expected to go a long way to 
ameliorate all the conditions of the customers´.38 To date DLF remains the only case 
in the real estate sector that has passed two levels of antitrust scrutiny. If the flurry of 
cases39 that were brought before the CCI on real estate practices following the CCI 
verdict is anything to go by, the consumer remedies granted in DLF would not benefit 
consumers who are dealing with smaller real estate developers 7KH &&,¶V
recommendations to the Government of India in the DLF case on the prevalence of 
                                                          
37Ibid, at ¶12.93. 
38DLF Limited vs. Competition Commission of India; COMPAT Order dated 09 May 2014 in Appeal No. 20 of 2011. 
39Case No. 43 of 2012, Case No. 24 of 2014, Case No. 97 of 2014, Case No. 101 of 2014, Case No. 89 of 2015, Case 
No. 103 of 2015, Case No. 14 of 2016, Case No. 59 of 2016, Case No. 60 of 2016 among others.   
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µXQIDLU WUDGH SUDFWLFHV¶ LQ WKH UHDO HVWDWH VHFWRU DUH SHUKDSV D WHVWDPHQW WR WKH
UHJXODWRU¶VODXGDEOHDWWHPSWWREDODQFHHTXLWLHVLQDILUVWRILWVNLQGdirect consumer 
harm case. The Parliament has since notified the Real Estate (Regulation and 
Development) Act, 201640 for regulation and promotion of the real estate sector and 
to protect the interest of consumers in the real estate sector and to establish an 
adjudicating mechanism for speedy resolution of disputes. It remains to be seen 
whether this Act will result in lesser competition scrutiny in the real estate space and 
whether the CCI will renounce this jurisdiction.  
(c) Regulation of unfair trade practices 
The deletion of UTPs from the scope of the Competition Act is also significant. The 
Sachar Committee had originally recommended the retention of UTPs in the MRTPA 
VLQFHWKHVH³SUDFWLFHVZHUHOLNHO\WRFDXVHJUDYHORVVRUGDPDJHWRPDQ\FRQVXPHUV´.41 
However, there is no concept of UTPs as understood in the MRTPA sense, in the 
Competition Act. While the WHUP³XQIDLU´KDVEHHQHPSOR\HGLQWKH&RPSHWLWLRQ$FW
it is used in the context of restrictive trade practices by a dominant entity under Section 
4. The Competition Act GHILQHVD µGRPLQDQWHQWLW\¶DVRQHZKRHQMR\VDSRVLWLRQRI
strength in a relevant market which enables it to (i) operate independently of 
competition forces and (ii) affect its competitors, consumers or the relevant market in 
its favour. Under Section 4, the Competition Act prohibits the imposition of an unfair 
price or condition in the purchase or sale of goods or services. The Consumer Act also 
GRHV QRW GHILQH WKH WHUP µXQIDLU¶ EXW LW IROORZV DQ µHIIHFWV¶ RYHU µIRUP¶ DSSURDFK LQ
regulating UTPs. Illustratively, in the Unitech cases, 42  the National Consumer 
Disputes Redressal Forum has held that practices may be termed to be UTPs even 
while they may not be expressly covered in Section 2(r)43 of the Consumer Act but 
relate to adopting unfair means and methods in relation to the consumer.   As we have 
brought out in the NSE FDVHDERYHWKH&&,¶VHQIRUFHPHQWSUDFWLFHGRHVQRWVXJJHVW
DQµHIIHFWVRYHUIRUP¶DSSURDFK%XWWKLVGHILQLWLRQRIWKHZRUGµXQIDLU¶FDPHXSIRU
consideration before the Competition Appellate Tribunal in a different case. In Schott 
Glass,44 the Competition Appellate Tribunal considered whether the application of 
unfair and discriminatory terms of price and conditions of supply contravened Section 
4(2)(a) of the Act. The Appellate Tribunal held that in the absence of any effect on the 
market or effect on consumers, the imposition of terms by a dominant entity could not 
be held to be unfair. 7KHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHWHUP³XQIDLU´XQGHUWKH&RPSHWLWLRQ$FW
therefore necessarily diverges from the LQFOXVLYHµHIIHFWVRYHUIRUP¶WUHDWPHQWRI873¶V
under the Consumer Act. 7KH&&,¶VGHFLVLRQDOSUDFWLFHKDVGLVWLQJXLVKHGVHYHUDO873
cases in the past. In Sanjeev Pandey v Mahendra & Mahendra & Ors, 45  the 
complainant alleged that a certain model of vehicle was introduced by the opposite 
                                                          
40The Real Estate (Regulation And Development) Act, 2016 No. 16 of 2016 notified on 26 Mach 2016. 
41Ibid. 
42  Parvinder Singh vs. Unitech Limited, Consumer Case No. 449 of 2013 Decided On: 12.02.2016; Satish Kumar 
Pandey v. M/s. Unitech Ltd., Consumer Case No. 427/2014 Decided On: 08.06.2015 
43  Id. 
44Schott Glass India Private Limited vs. Competition Commission of India, COMPAT Appeal Nos. 91 and 92 of 2012, 
Order dated 02 April 2014. 
45Case No 17 of 2012. 
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parties in certain states, denying the benefit of increased sales to distributors. The CCI 
closed the inquiry noting that the Consumer Act sets a more appropriate course to 
assail UTPs. Similarly, Subhash Yadav v. Force Motor Ltd and Ors46 related to a 
FRQVXPHU¶VJULHYDQFHDULVLQJRXWRIa purchase of a vehicle from the opposite party. 
The informant alleged that the engine started overheating when the air-conditioning 
was on. It was stated by the informant, that the opposite party had used Daimler 
engine in the said vehicle which is normally used in the Mercedes SUVs which is priced 
at three hundred thousand rupees, but was used in a Force One car priced at more 
than a million rupees. It was also alleged that the opposite party created a dominant 
position by cutting into the market in India by pricing the vehicle at a very competitive 
price compared to other manufacturers. The CCI declined to intervene in the matter 
and concluded that the essential difference between the Consumer and Competition 
Acts is that the former provides a direct grievance redress mechanism to the consumer, 
while the later ensures that markets remain competitive thereby indirectly ensuring 
consumer benefit. These cases really presented core consumer issues before the CCI. 
IV. The Need for Correct Separation of UTPs and RTPs 
This section aims to demonstrate why it is important to correctly distinguish between 
UTPs and RTPs in practice to achieve the optimal separation between consumer 
protection and competition laws. Let us assume for a moment the existence of an UTP 
practised by a dominant entity. What should be the degree of antitrust enforcement in 
such situations? For example, courts in the United States have preferred an effect 
based approach to this question. In Official Airline Guides (OAG), 47  the FTC 
challenged the refusal by a monopolist/publisher of airline schedules to include in its 
compendium schedules of commuter airlines, before a U.S. Court of Appeals. This 
refusal to deal was discriminatory, unjustified, and injurious to commuter airlines in 
their competition with certificated airlines. The monopolist, however, did not act 
FRHUFLYHO\ GLG QRW FRPSHWH LQ WKH FRPPXWHU DLUOLQHV¶ PDUNHW ZKHUH WKH DQWLWUXVW
injury occurred, and did not seek or have any prospect of gaining power in that market. 
Although the court acknowledged that FTC determinations as to what practices 
FRQVWLWXWH DQ ³XQIDLU PHWKRG RI FRPSHWLWLRQ´ GHVHUYH JUHDW ZHLJKW LW GHFOLQHG WR
XSKROG WKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V RUGHU ,Q H[SODLQLQJ LWV GHFLVLRQ WKH FRXUW H[SUHVVHG
concern that declaring such conduct unlawful would give the Commission too much 
latitude to substitute its own judgePHQW IRU D UHVSRQGHQW¶V LQGHSHQGHQW EXVLQHVV
decisions that were taken without any anticompetitive purpose or prospect. In essence, 
although the challenged conduct was discriminatory and harmful, it did not violate the 
policies underlying the antitrust laws.48 Similarly, in Boise Cascade,49 a U.S. Court of 
Appeals, 9th Circuit, was considering an industry-wide delivered pricing system. The 
case related to the introduction of an artificial freight factor in the price charged to 
customers. The FTC alleged that such practices tend to stabilize prices and therefore 
                                                          
46Case No. 32 of 2012. 
47 Official Airline Guides, 630 F.3d at 927 
48  Extract from the Concurring Opinion of Commissioner Jon Leibowitz in the Matter Of Rambus, Inc. Docket 
No. 9302, FTC. 
49Boise Cascade, 637 F.2d at 581. 
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violated the Sherman and FTC Acts. The court negatived this contention and held that 
the use of delivered pricing was in the nature of price parallelism in response to 
customer preferences. The court found that the issue of whether consciously parallel 
conduct on its own could ever violate Section 5 of the FTC Act was non-sequitur since 
in the case at hand, persuasive evidence of an anticompetitive effect was lacking. The 
Court concluded that this history had resulted in a requirement that ³the Commission 
must find either collusion or actual effect on competition to make out a Section 5 
violation for use of delivered pricing´50. More recently, in 2015, the FTC issued a 
Statement of Enforcement Principles regarding WKH $JHQF\¶V XVH RI µVWDQG DORQH¶
Section 5 authority to address unfair methods of competition.51 The mere issuing of 
such a statement over a hundred years after the FTC received the powers to enforce 
Section 5 is telling in that the relation between UTPs and anticompetitive practices is 
a complicated one even for such a mature jurisdiction. In its statement, the FTC 
clarified that in deciding whether to challenge a practice as an unfair method of 
competition in violation of Section 5 on a standalone basis, the FTC will be guided by 
the public policy underlying the antitrust laws, namely, the promotion of consumer 
welfare; the practice will be evaluated under a framework similar to the rule of reason 
(ie an act or practice challenged by the Commission must cause, or be likely to cause, 
harm to competition or the competitive process, taking into account any relevant 
efficiencies and business justifications); and the FTC is less likely to challenge a 
practice as an unfair method of competition on a standalone basis if enforcement of 
the Sherman or Clayton Act is sufficient to address the competitive harm arising from 
the practice. Although this statement goes some way in explaining that the exercise of 
the powers to control unfair methods of competition is driven by an inquiry into 
whether there is harm to competition, in her dissenting Opinion, Commissioner 
Ohlhausen notes that this policy statement leaves too much discretion to the FTC in 
allowing it to potentially apply Section 5 in situations where there is no substantial 
harm to competition.52In contrast to the developments in the US, the relation between 
unfair trade practices and anticompetitive practices remains a complicated one in the 
EU. 
In the EU, the issue represents a thorny one particularly given the stipulations of 
Article 102 TFEU concerning unfair trading conditions which are sufficiently broad to 
FRYHU PDQ\ W\SHV RI XQIDLU SUDFWLFHV VRPH RI ZKLFK FDQ DOVR FRQVWLWXWH µXQIDLU
FRPPHUFLDOSUDFWLFHV¶XQGHUWKHH[LVWLQJFRQVXPHUSURWHFWLRQOHJLVODWLRQ There is a 
danger, therefore, in the EU as well that Article 102 TFEU is applied to prohibit unfair 
practices (such as those that might harm the interests of a competitor) where there is 
no harmful effects on competition. This is coupled by the fact that in EU competition 
law, it is debateable whether harmful effects of competition are required for the Article 
                                                          
50  Boise Cascade, 637 F.2d at 581 ¶¶35. 
51See Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding ³8QIDLU0HWKRGVRI&RPSHWLWLRQ´8QGHU6HFWLRQRIWKH
FTC Act, 13 August 2015, available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/735201/150813section5enforcement.pdf. 
52See Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Maureen K Ohlhausen: FTC Act Section 5 Policy Statement, 13 
August 2015, available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/735371/150813ohlhausendissentfinal.pdf. 
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102 TFEU prohibition to be applicable and in any case, what sort of effects would 
suffice in this inquiry. It is clear that actual effects on competition are not required: 
what is sufficient is, at most, likely effects.53 However, even in this pursuit of effects, it 
LV GHEDWDEOH ZKHWKHU IRU H[DPSOH HIIHFWV RQ D GRPLQDQW XQGHUWDNLQJ¶V FRPSHWLWRU
would suffice as the requisite effects or whether effects on consumer welfare are 
necessary.54 This is particularly an issue concerning so-called exploitative practices 
which do not require an immediate distortion of competition but represent themselves 
in mainly the demonstration of harmful effects on the customers ± including final 
consumers - of the dominant undertaking. Akman has argued elsewhere that although 
it is indisputable that Article 102 TFEU prohibits exploitative conduct, in order to 
ensure that Article 102 TFEU is enforced as a competition rule ± which it is intended 
to be ± it must be coupled with exclusionary conduct that harms competition before it 
can be found abusive.55 This has not been the case so far in the EU decisional practice. 
Although the enforcement of Article 102 TFEU by the Commission has mostly focussed 
on exclusionary abuses, in the few cases where exploitation was an issue, such 
exploitation was not necessarily ± demonstrably ± coupled with exclusion which raises 
questions as to the appropriateness of the action. For example, in British Leyland, 
1998 Football World Cup and BdKEP certain price-based and other practices of a 
dominant undertaking were IRXQGµXQIDLU¶DQGWKXVZHUHSHUKDSVµH[SORLWDWLYH¶RIWKH
customer, but it was not necessarily obvious how these were harmful to competition.56 
Similarly, in cases such as SABAM, GEMA, DSD and Tetra Pak II ZKHUHµXQIDLUWUDGLQJ
FRQGLWLRQV¶ZHUHIRXQGWREHDEXVLYHLWLVXQFOHDUZK\VXFKFRQWUDFWXDO clauses were 
deemed to be a competition law issue.57 There are also cases which held to be abusive 
the consequences of the inefficiency of the dominant undertaking that would have 
exploited the trading partners of the said undertaking without necessarily also having 
distortive effects on competition. 58  Without this separate showing of harm to 
competition in the form of, for example, exclusion, some of these practices appear 
more like contractual or consumer protection problems than competition law 
                                                          
53See eg Case C-23/14 Post Danmark A/S v KonkurrencerådetEU:C:1979:36, [67]. 
54For the extensive literature on the discussion whether EU competition law protects competitors or competition, 
see eg 3-HEVHQDQG56WHYHQVµ$VVXPSWLRQV*RDOVDQG'RPLQDQW8QGHUWDNLQJV7KH5HJXODWLRQRI&RPSHWLWLRQ
Under Article 86 oI WKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶  $QWLWUXVW/DZ-RXUQDO - .DOODXJKHUDQG%6KHU
µ5HEDWHV5HYLVLWHG$QWL-&RPSHWLWLYH(IIHFWVDQG([FOXVLRQDU\$EXVHXQGHU$UWLFOH¶(&/5
277; '*HUDGLQ µ/LPLWLQJ WKH6FRSH RI$UWLFOH(&:KDW&DQ WKH(8/HDUQ IURPWKH 866XSUHPH &RXUW¶V
Judgment in Trinkoin the Wake of Microsoft, IMS, and Deutsche Telekom? (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 
1519, 1532. For the case law, see eg Case T-286/09 Intel Corp v European Commission ECLI:EU:T:2014:547, [105] 
noting that harm to consumers is not necessary for conduct to be abusive. 
55See P Akman The Concept of Abuse in EU Competition Law: Law and Economics Approaches (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2012) in particular 307-310 
56 Case 226/84 British Leyland plc v Commission [1987] 1 CMLR 185; 1998 Football World Cup (Case IV/36/888) 
Commission Decision 2001/12/EC [2000] OJ L5/55; BdKEP ± Restrictions on Mail Preparation (Case 
COMP/38.745) Commission Decision 20 October 2004 (unreported). 
57Akman (n 55) 321. 
58 Akman (n 55) 320. Such cases include Case C-179/90 Merciconvenzionaliporto di Genova SpA v 
SiderurgicaGabrielliSpA[1991] ECR I-5889; Case C-41/90 Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v Macrotron GmbH [1991] 
ECR I-1979; British Telecommunications (Case IV/29/877) Commission Decision 82/861/EEC [1982] OJ L360/36; 
P&I Clubs, IGA and P&I Clubs, Pooling Agreement (Case IV/D-1/30.373 and IV/D-1/37.143) Commission Decision 
1999/329/EC [1999] OJ L125/12. 
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problems. 59  Such practices should consequently be tackled under contract law or 
consumer protection law and not competition law. 
In India, the CCI has  also had to grapple with this issue in its decisional practice. In 
Shivang Agarwal & Ors. vs. Supertech Ltd. Noida,60 the CCI recognized that UTPs are  
adopted by many enterprises whether dominant or not. Every unfair trade 
practices or abuse done by an enterprise is not covered under Competition Act. 
Several aspects of the unfairness on part of service provider/goods provider are 
covered by the Consumer Protection Act. The two aspects covered by the 
Consumer Protection Act are unfair trade practice as well as charging of price 
in excess of the price agreed upon between the parties.  
 
In Mr. Gajinder Singh Kohli vs. Genius Propbuild Private Limited, 61  the CCI 
considered whether delay in delivering possession of an apartment amounted to an 
abuse of dominant position. The opposite pDUW\FKDOOHQJHGWKH&&,¶V MXULVGLFWLRQWR
inquire into UTPs. The CCI however examined the matter on its merits observing that 
since the issue involved was of abuse of dominant position, the CCI would review the 
FDVH WR GHWHUPLQH ZKHWKHU LW EUHDFKHG WKH $FW¶V DEXVH RI GRPLQDQFH SURYLVLRQV ,W
QRWHGWKDWWKH&&,¶VHQIRUFHPHQWSUDFWLFHLVSUHGLFDWHGRQWKHH[LVWHQFHRIXQLODWHUDO
conduct of the kind defined under Section 4 of the Act.  
With the existing invasive proliferation of e-commerce and digital media in the Indian 
market, the conduct of firms, as they adapt to business and competition, need not 
necessarily take a form based approach. As such, where practices do not fall within the 
rigid descriptions of unilateral conduct under Section 4, the CCI must consider an 
effects based approach to enforcement. Naturally, this may also call for amendments 
to the existing statute since UTPs remain explicitly excluded from the purview of the 
Competition Act unlike, for example, Article 102 TFEU which explicitly covers unfair 
prices and unfair trading conditions.62 
Experiences of other regulators in dealing with UTPs that distort or restrict 
competition shed considerable light on the desirability of an effects based approach. 
For example, tKH.RUHDQ)DLU7UDGH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V*XLGHOLQHV IRU5HYLHZRI8QIDLU
Trade Practices63 SUHVFULEHD µfair trade hLQGHULQJ¶ WKUHVKROG IRU873V8QGHU WKHVH
guidelines, Fair Trade Hindering involves a significant or possible reduction of the 
number of competitive businesses (including potential competitive business) or 
degree of market competition caused by the related act. Relatedly, they prescribe 
µuQIDLUQHVV¶ as an objective determination of unfair trade or competitive means. 
Unfairness of competitive means involves hindering or possible hindering of fair 
competition using improper competitive means apart from the cost and quality of 
                                                          
59Akman (n 55) 307. 
60Case No. 28 of 2012. 
61Case No. 15 of 2016. 
62Ibid, Section 66. 
63Guidelines for Review of Unfair Trade Practices, 12 August 2009. 
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services or goods. Unfair trade refers to a violation or a possible violation of the 
foundation of fair trade by causing a disadvantage or hindering free decision making 
based on the business relation.  
A related question is the advisability of consumer fora to look into limited issues of 
anti-competitive conduct against consumers at a policy level. Some may argue that 
they do look at limited RTP and UTP issues relevant to consumers; but regulations 
must keep up with the times and the development of business practices. We must 
consider whether consumer fora armed with powers akin to the CCI have been better 
able to tackle real estate practices and lay down a code for good practices, like the CCI 
recommended in DLF. This may have bypassed contentious issues of market power 
and competition foreclosure of the ilk of DLF and the real estate cases that succeeded 
it. By contrast, the )7&¶V H[SHULHQFHV ZLWK 6HFWLRQ  RI WKH 86 )HGHUDO 7UDGH
Commission Act which prohibits µXQIDLU methods of competition in commerce, and 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce' sheds considerable light on the 
desirability of convergence in consumer and competition policy and practice. A 1938 
amendment to the FTC Act64 made it clear that a consumer, who may be injured by an 
unfair trade practice, is of equal concern before the law, with the merchant or 
manufacturer injured by the unfair methods of a dishonest competitor. The U.S. 
Supreme Court affirmed this broad mandate in FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.65 in 
these words: 
&RQJUHVV « GHILQHV the powers of the FTC to protect consumers as well as 
competitors, and authorizes it to determine whether challenged practices, 
though posing no threat to competition within the letter or spirit of the antitrust 
laws, are nevertheless either unfair methods of competition or unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices. The Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938 reaffirms this broad 
congressional mandate. 
 
V. Conclusion 
While the jurisdictions and mandate of consumer fora and the CCI under Indian law 
are vastly different, with a total of 3.7 million consumer cases pending in consumer 
forums until 2014,66 it would be advisable that a certain level of market regulation in 
favour of the consumer is introduced into the existing system by either generating a 
best practices code or by enabling suo-moto regulation by the consumer fora. Some of 
these changes have already been conceptualised in the form of the Consumer 
Protection (Amendment) Bill, 2015 which proposes the establishment of a Central 
Consumer Protection Authority (CCPA) to promote, protect and enforce the rights of 
consumers. The CCPA will carry out the following functions, among others: (i) 
inquiring into violations of consumer rights, investigating and launching prosecution 
at the appropriate forum; (ii) passing orders for recall of goods, or withdrawal of 
services and reimbursement of the price paid, and pass directions for discontinuation 
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of unfair trade practices; (iii) issuing safety notices and order withdrawal of 
advertisements; and (iv) declaring contracts that are unfair to a consumer as void.67 
The starting point in setting policy should be the recognition that competition law and 
consumer protection law have separate functions, mechanisms and to a degree 
separate objectives even if one of the common goals might be the enhancement and 
protection of the interests of consumers. The two areas of law protect consumer 
interests in different ways. The objectives of competition law are much narrower than 
the wider consumer protection law goals.68 Competition law should be enforced to 
prohibit practices that distort competition and thus are detrimental to consumer or 
total welfare (or any other ultimate goal) as determined by policy.69 The scrutiny of 
practices that are merely exploitative of the customers of a dominant undertaking 
through unfair practices and the like without also being exclusionary through 
distortive effects on competition may require competition authorities to act as 
regulators for which they are unlikely to be the appropriate bodies.70  
The Indian legislator, by removing UTPs from the scope of the Competition Act, has 
already demonstrated its preference for the demarcation of consumer protection law 
and competition law in the context of UTPs. This demonstrates a more modern 
approach to competition law than both that of the US and the EU neither of which has 
achieved such separation in the legislation. The proposal to set up an apex body (the 
CCPA) with powers akin to the CCI to look specifically at consumer issues is a welcome 
step to ensure that consumer interest is preserved both in terms of consumer 
protection from unfair and restrictive practices by the CCPA; and consumer welfare by 
ensuring effective competition through the CCI. Although in the US, through the case 
law and FTC policy, UTPs have been made subject to a demonstration of harm to 
competition before they will be acted against, the EU still lags behind in finding a 
workable separation concerning the competition law treatment of practices that may 
harm the interests of consumers without necessarily also distorting competition. In 
fact, the EU has also not found a solution to the issue of the treatment of practices that 
may harm competitors without necessarily also causing harm to consumers. All in all, 
it is clear that there is a lot the jurisdictions under examination can learn from one 
another on the interplay between consumer protection law and competition law. 
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